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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HEBER W. GLENN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs

Case No.

8780
RENA S. PLAYER, sometimes known as
SERENA PLAYER,
Defendant and Respondent:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF PACTS
This action was brought by the plaintiff and appellant
against the defendant and respondent for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of real property dated
February 11, 1932 (Tr. 21), Exhibit 3-P.) Said agreement is designated as a Sales Contract and is executed
by ·C. F. Player and Serena Player, his wife, as sellers and
Heber W. Glenn as buyer. It describes certain real property
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting of
approximately 13 acres of land about a mile and a half
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west of Redwood Road and about a mile south of 48th South
St. (Tr. 17). The purchase price is at the rate of $200.00
per acre and payable $il000.00 paid by the buyer at the
time of the execution of the agreement, receipt of which is
acknowledged and $600.00 on or before May 11, 1942 and
the balance of the purchase price on or before Aug. 11, 1942.
The agreement also contains the following agreement: "It
is understood and agreed by both the sellers and the buyer
that the buyer at his option, when he has paid ·$100.00 more
than is sufficient to cover the full payment, at the rate of
$200 per acre on either of the above tracts of land as described, rna y enter onto said tract of land, fully paid for,
and take possession and receive clear title thereto and such
action shall not alter in any way the balance of the contract."
(Exhibit 3-P.)
That subsequent to the 11th day of February, 1942,
the plaintiff entered into possession of the said real property
and removed gravel therefrom. (Tr. 19, 35 and 36)
That on May 10, 1942 the plaintiff offered to the
sellers the balance of the purchase price and requested a deed
and abstract of the property (Tr. 23, 29) and sellers failed
to comply with said request.
Subsequently on the 7th day of May, 1951 the said
C. F. Player died and the defendant was appointed ex·
ecutrix of the estate of C. F. Player (Tr. 48) and the real
property described in said agreement was distributed to the
defendant herein under the estate of C. F. Player deceased.
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That at no time, either during the life of C. F. Player or
since his death, was the plaintiff served with any kind of
notice of cancellation of the contract. (Tr. 28, 55)
That during the lifetime of the said C. F. Player the
plaintiff made other visits to the Player home to settle the
agreement and to obtain a deed to the premises. ( Tr. 30)
That subsequently on Feb. 3rd, 1949 the plaintiff
had the said agreement recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah in Book 660,
page 123. (Tr. 31)
That on March 29th, 1956 tender was made by the
plaintiff through his attorneys to the defendant by registered mail of the balance of the purchase price and a request
for a conveyance of said real property. (Tr. 32)
That at no time has the defendant offered to refund the
money paid on the agreement (Tr. 52) or give a deed on
said real property (Tr. 53).
That. the plaintiff did not file a claim in the estate of
C. F. Player and proceeded with his action for specific
performance of the agreement, after the distribution had been
made to the defendant herein, against the defendant.
The plaintiff now appeals from the decree of the trial
court dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and declaring that
the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the real property described in the agreement nor in the Sales agreement
dated Feb. 11, 1942.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Appellant and Plaintiff respectfully submits five
points:

POINT ONE
Contract is entitled to be specifically enforced by the
application of established principles or rules of equity
designed for the administering of justice.

POINT TWO
Delay in pedormance of contract is not enough to defeat specific performance.

POINT THREE
Part performance entitled vendee to specific perform·
ance of contract.

POINT FOUR
Optional part of agreement should he enforced as a
matter of right.

POINT FIVE
Purchaser not required to file a claim against estate
of C. F. Player.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
The appellant is entitled to a decree of specific per·
formance of the agreement if the application of established
principles or rules of equity designed for the administering
of justice are applied.
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49 Am. Jur. Specific Performance Sec. 9 (page 17)
"As a general rule it may be said that when
the party seeking specific performance of a contract
establishes the existence of a valid binding contract
which is definite and certain in its terms and contain
the requisities of mutuality of obligation and is one
which is free from unfairness, fraud or overreaching
and enforceable without injustice upon the party
against whom enforcement is sought, the court will,
when the remedy at law for the breach of such contract is inadequate and the enforcement of specific
performance will not be inequitable, oppressive or
unconscionable, or result in undue hardship, grant
a decree of specific performance as a matter of
course or right.
Rights of the plaintiff to such relief where he
makes a case coming within these equitable rules is
not dependent upon any exercise or discretionary
power on the part of the court in the literal sense of
the term."
Bennett vs. Moon, 110 Neb. 692, 194 N.W. 802,
Let us look at the agreement in controversy described
as "Sales Contract." It is entered into by and between C. F.
Player and Serena Player, his wife as Sellers and Heber
W. Glenn as Buyer; the said Serena Player being the defendant and respondent in this action and the said Heber
W. Glenn being the plaintiff and appellant. The real property to be sold is adequately described. The acreage of
approximately 13 acres is stated. The purchase price is at
the rate of ·$200 per acre and payable $1000.00 in hand paid
by the buyers, the receipt of which is acknowledged, $600.00
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on or before May 11, 1942 and the balance of the purchase
price on or before Aug. 11, 1942. In fact in excess of
33 1/3% of the purchase price was paid at the time of
the execution of the sales contract.
The "Sales Contract" is a valid binding contract which
is definite and certain in its terms and contains the requisites of mutuality of obligation and there has been no
evidence introduced which would infer that it was unfair or
fraudulent, and certainly the buyer indicated his good faith
in the purchase in paying a substantial part of the purchase
price upon the execution of the contract.

65 A.L.R. page 8, Specific Perfomance as Matter of Right
''When a party to a contract appeals to a court of
equity for a decree for specific performance, he addresses himself to what is termed the 'judicial discretion' of the court.
"The question whether a contract will be
specifically enforced will he determined by the application of established principles or rules of equity
designed for the administering of justice and which
are appropriate to the circumstances of the particular
case. Primarily the contract sought to be enforced
should be definite and legally binding upon the
parties, and its enforcement should he practical and
equitable."
L'Engle vs. Overstreet 61 Fla. 653, 55 So. 381.
"The jurisdiction of a court of equity in decreeing a specific performance of an agreement, is
a peculiar jurisdiction in the exercise of which that
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forum becomes of its own inherent strength, a court of
.
"
conscience.
Hudson vs. King. 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 560.
"It is said to be a discretionary jurisdiction, not
indeed, or arbitrary or capricious discretion, dependent upon the mere pleasure of the judge, but of that
sound and reasonable discretion which governs itself,
as far as it may, by general rules and principles but
at the same time which withholds or grants relief
according to the circumstances of each particular case,
when these rules and principles will not furnish any
exact measure· of justice between the parties."
McNeil vs. McNeil, 61 Utah 141, 221 Pac. 988, which states:
"The right to specific performance depends not
upon hard and fast rules according to which all cases
are to be decided, but each is dependent upon its
own peculiar facts and circumstances."
Halloran Judge Trust Co. vs. Heath, (Utah) 258 Pac. 342.
65 A.L.R. page 14. Meaning of term "discretion"
"Specific peformance of a contract to convey
real estate will not be arbitrarily denied by the court,
but only the exercise of a sound judicial discretion,
in harmony with established principles and rules of
equity."
Griffin vs. Nash, 187 Iowa 345, 174 N.W. 233.
Roberts vs. Braffett 33 Utah 51, 92 Pac. 789.
65 A.L.R. page 39.
"The inadequacy of the legal remedy to enforce
a contract for the sale of land is assumed in every
case where no objection is made thereto, and specific
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performance of the contract follows as a matter of
course."
Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619.
"Warren vs. Goodloe, Ky. 20 S.W. 2nd 278
holds that where a contract for the sale of land is
fairly made, it is the duty of the court to enforce it.
Where the contract sought to be enforced specifically
concerns land the jurisdiction to enforce specific performance is undisputed and does not depend upon
the inadequacy o£ the legal remedy in the particular
case."
"Specific performance of a contract for the sale
of land is a matter of right where it appears that the
land sold for its actual value, that the sale was bona
fide, that timely legal tender was made of the entire
purchase price and performance was demanded."
Beheret vs. Myers 240 Mo. 58, 144 S.W. 824.
May we again call the court's attention to the fact that
on May 10, 1942 the plaintiff offered to the sellers the
balance of the purchase price and requested a deed and
abstract of the property. (Tr. 23, 29)
That during the lifetime of the said C. F. Player the
plaintiff made other visits to the Player home to settle the
agreement and to obtain a deed to the premises. (Tr. 30)
That on Mar. 28, 1956 tender was again made and a
request for conveyance. (Tr. 32)

POINT TWO
Delay in performance of contract is not enough to de·
feat specific performance.
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 73, page 89. Specific Performance.
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"Although it is universally recognized that inexcusable laches or default on the part of the party
seeking such relief will be a sufficient ground for the
denial of the relief, the vendor, to make the plaintiff's delay available as a defense, must have performed or been ready and willing to perform all the
terms of the contract stipulated for on his own part."
Tate vs. Pensacola Gulf Land and Dev. Co. 37 Fla. 439,
20, 542.
Leaf vs. Codd, 41 Idaho 547, 240 Pac. 593.
49 Am. J ur. Sec. 7 4, page 90.
Delay alone is not enough.
Wilson vs. Holub, 202 Iowa 549, 210 N.W. 593
Delay caused by the acts of the defendant will not constitute laches.
Davis vs. Gray 16 Wall 203, 21 L ed 447,
Hallin vs. Rogers 176 F 709, 34 Lra 120
A plaintiff is not chargeable with laches until he has
knowledge, that his rights under a contract are being disputed
by the other party.
De Cordova vs. Smith 9 Tex. 129, 55 Am. Dec. 136.
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 75, page 92. Period Constituting Laches:
"What length of time will constitute such laches
as to bar recovery in a suit for specific performance
depends upon many circumstances and rests largely
in the sound discretion of the court. The lapse of time
must be so great, and the relations of the defendant
to the right such, that it would be inequitable to permit the plaintiff to assert such right."
Easkin vs. Wycoff, 118 Kan. 168, 234 P. 63
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"What is a reasonable time within which to file
a bill for specific performance cannot be fixed with
precision by any general rule, but such delay as
raises a presumption that the party has abandoned
the contract is considered the equivalent to consent
to its recission."
De ·Huy vs~ Osborne 96 Fla. 435, 118 So. 161
Chabot vs. Winter Park Co. 34 Fla. 258, 15 So. 756
"Thus it follows that delay of a few months may
constitute laches, and the decisions refusing specific
performance include periods of from a few to many
years and it has been granted following delays as
long as 35 years."
In Craig vs. Leiper 2 Yerg. (Term) 193, 24 Am. Dec.
479, Where it appears that delay has been by the consent
of both parties and occasioned by the vendor's failing to
obtain the legal title, specific performance has been decreed
.notwithstanding a lapse of thirty years from the making
of ~the contract.
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 76, page 93. "In order for
delay in seeking specific performance to constitute
laches it must have been prejudicial to the defendant."
Oliver vs. Poulos 312 Mass. 188, 44 N.E. 2nd l,
65 A.L.R. 55. "But mere delay in performance of a contract will not ordinarily preclude a decree for its
specific performance, where acquiesced in by the
other party."
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Many cases cited.
Laches due to the act of the defendant will not preclude
specific performance in behalf of the plaintiff.
Zempel vs. Hughes 235 Ill. 424, 85 N.E. 641.
"If the delay upon the part of the vendee is
attributable to the conduct of the vendor, it will not
stand in the way of a decree for specific performance
of the contract in'· behalf of the vendee."
Howard vs. Moore 4 Sneed (Tenn) 317.
"Delay by the vendee in paying the purchase
price, where the vendor takes no steps to forfeit the
vendee's rights under an executory contract for the
purchase of land, will not preclude relief in behaH
of the vendee who has paid a large share of the pur. ''
chase price.
Lewis vs. Wellard, 62 Wash 590, 114 Pac. 455.
81 C.J. Sec. page 639, Specific Performance
"Where time for performance is not essential
the mere lapse of time does not necesarily bar plaintiff from relief. No rule with respect to the length
of the delay which will be fatal to relief can be laid
down, but each case must depend on its peculiar
circumstances. A delay will not deprive plaintiff
of relief if he has never abandoned the contract and
the defendant has suffered nothing from the delay
for which he cannot be compensated in te decree."
Yates vs. American Republics Corp. 163 F2nd 178
Garbis vs. Weistock 51 A 2nd 154, 187 Md. 549.
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4. Now, let us apply the foregoing to the facts in the present
case.
,The plaintiff offered to the sellers the balance of the
purchase price on May 10, 1942 (Tr. 23, 29) and made
other attempts to obtain the deed ( Tr. 30) and the defendant as one of the sellers was not ready or willing to perform
her· part of the contract.
The plaintiff is not chargeable with laches until he has
know ledge that his rights are being disputed by the other
party. At no time, during the life of C. F. Player or since
his death, was the plaintiff served with any kind of notice
of cancellation of the contract. Tr. 28, 55)
At no time could it be presumed that plaintiff had
abandoned the contract, in view of his substantial down payment, (See exhibit 3 P ) , the fact that he recorded the contract
on Feb. 3, 1949 (Tr. 31) and also made tender of payment
to the defendant (Tr. 32)
Certainly the delay has been by the consent of both
parties and would have been paid on May 10, 1942 if the
vendors had delivered title.
The Roberts vs. Braffett case, 33 Utah 51.
A contract for the sale of real estate entered into in
March 1902 called for performance the following October
by the payment of the price and the execution of the deed.
The purchaser paid a part of the price, hut failed to pay the
balance due in October. The vendor frequently thereafter
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demanded payment and notified the purchaser to pay or the
contract would be rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that
notwithstanding his delay and neglect, he is entitled to have
the contract specifically enforced because the defendant made
no tender of a deed and therefore did not put the plaintiff
in legal default.
The case of Roberts vs. Braffett is an analysis of the
law which particularly affects many aspects of the present
case. May we call the Court's attention to the fact that in the
Sales Contract there is no reference to time being the essence of the contract. (See Exhibit)
Justice Straup in his opinion makes this statement:
"It may be conceded that the stipulations and
provisions contained in the contract were mutual,
concurrent and dependent. It may also be conceded
that time was not of the essence of the contract as originally made." He then refers to Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contract, Section 395 ( 2d Ed.)
"As the doctrine that time is not essential in the
performance of the contract may sometime work injustice, and be used as the excuse for unwarrantabl~
laches, the following rule was introduced at a comparatively late period and is now firmly settled,
which prevents the doctrine from being abused by
the neglect or willfulness of either party. If either
the vendor or the vendee has improperly and unreasonably delayed in complying with the terms of the
agreement on his side, the other party may, by notice,
fix upon and assign a reasonable time for complet-
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ing the contract, and may call upon the defaulting
party to do the acts to be done by him, or any particular act within this period. The time thus allotted
then becomes essential and if the party in default fails
to perform before it has elapsed, the court will not
aid him in enforcing the contract, but will leave him
to his legal remedy."
At Section 396 Pomeroy says: "That the notice
cannot be arbitrary and a sudden termination of the
contract; it must allow a reasonable length of time
for the other party to perform and if it fails in any
of these respects it may be disregarded and will
produce no effect upon the equitable remedial rights
of party to whom it is given; and that to be effectual
in making the time allotted an essential element of the
performance the notice must be express, clear, distinct, and unequivocal."
The defendant admits in her testimony that no notice
of cancellation was ever given. (Tr. 28, 56)
At Sections 361 and 362 Pomeroy points out the distinction between granting specific performance of contracts
when time is and when not, made essential. He says:
"Where the stipulations are mutual and dependant-that is, where the deed is to be delivered upon
the payment of the price, either on a day named or
without any day being specified, an actuai tender and
demand by one party is absolutely necessary to put
the other in default and to cut off his right to treat
the agreement as still subsisting. So long as neither
party makes such tender-of the deed by the vendor
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and of the price or securities by the vendee-neither
party is in default; the contract remains in force and
either party rna y make a proper tender or offer
antI sue. "
POINT THREE
Part performance entitled vendee to specific performance of contract.
65 A.L.R. page 63. "An exception to the rule
that a court will not enforce an inequitable contract
is that where the defendant has received the consideration and retains it and alleges as a ground for not
being required to perform that performance would be
inequitable under the circumstances the court will
decree performance without inquiry into the question."
Indianapolis Northern Traction Co. vs. Essington 54
Ind. App. 286 99 N.E. 757, 100 N.E. 765.
"Where it is shown that there has been part performance of the contract under circumstances which
affect the conscience of the defendant and his failure
to carry out the contract would operate as a fraud
upon the plaintiff's right, a decree of specific performance will be granted as a matter of right."
Tidewater R. Co. vs. Hurt 109 Va. 204, 63 S.E. 421
West vs. Bundy 78 Mo. 407
Dougherty vs. Harsel, 91 Mo. 161, 3 S. W. 583
Anderson vs. Scott 94 Mo. 637, 8 S. W. 235
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49 Am. Jur. Sec. 76, page 94
"The purchaser in a contract for the sale of land
has been held not to be precluded, however, from
maintaining a suit for its specific performance hecause the land has increased in value, where such
increase has taken place after he has paid a part of
the purchase price and the delay in offering to pay
the balance is neither unreasonable nor due to had
faith."
Harris vs. Greenleaf, 117 Ky. 817, 79 S.W. 268, 4 Ann.
case. 849
In the case before the Court, it will be remembered that
the buyer had paid as a down payment in excess of one-third
of the purchase price. The defendant admits that the payment was received and that she has retained it. (Tr. 52)
In Roberts vs. Braffett 33 Utah page 91 Chief Justice
McCarty in his dissenting opinion makes the following statement and reference; which is significant to this portion of
this case:
"It is a well established doctrine that before a
party will be permitted to rescind his contract he
must account or offer to account to the other party for
the money, if any, paid in part performance of the
contract. In the case of Frnik vs. Thompson this
same principle of law was involved and in the course
of the opinion the court says:
"There is yet another reason why plaintiff cannot have this contract rescinded. It appears from
the complaint that soon a~ter making the contract
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defendant paid $340 of the purchase price. Before
plaintiff can abandon the contract and treat it as at
an end, he must refund or offer to refund the money
paid in performance of it, with legal accrued interest. It is a general rule that in order to disaffirm
a contract and entitled a party to the right resulting
therefrom, the rescinding party must put the other
in statu quo. It would certainly be unjust to permit
plaintiff, after having received a part of the purchase
money, to put an end to the contract, upon the failure
of defendant to pay the remainder, without offering
to account to him for the money already paid. He
who seeks the aid of a court of equity must himself
do equity."
This statement of rule was quoted and approved by this
court in the case of Brixen vs. Jorgensen, 28 Utah 290, 78
Pac. 674.
In Johnson vs. Jackson, 27 Miss. 498, 61 Am. Dec. 522,
it is said:
"The vendors could not abandon the contract and
treat it as at an end, without refunding to the vendee
the money he had paid in part pefromance of it. For
it is a general rule that, in order to disaffirm a contract and entitle the parties to the rights resulting
therefrom, both parties must be placed in statu quo.
It would certainly be unjust to permit the vendors
after having received part of the purchase money
from the vendee at the time of the contract, to put
an end to the contract upon the failure to pay the
residue of the purchase money and to make a resale
to a third person, without refunding the money paid."
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POINT FOUR
The Sales Contract reads as follows:
"It· is ~nderstood ·and agreed by both the sellers
and the buyer that the buyer at his option, when he
has paid One hundred ($100.) dollars more than is
sufficient to cover the full payment, at the rate of
$200. per acre on either of the above tracts of land
as described, rnay enter onto said tract of land, fully
paid for, and take possession and receive clear title
thereto and such action shall not alter in any way the
balance of this contract" (See Exhibit)
Another paragraph of Sales Contract reads as follows:
"In the event that the buyer shall fail to pay the
balance of the purchase price as herein provided, the
amount paid, over and above that necessary under the
provision stated above, to clear title to any of the
separate tracts described above, shall, at the option
of the sellers, he retained as liquidated and agreed
damages." (See Exhibit)
The defendant in her own evidence admits that she received $1100.00 from the plaintiff and that she has never
returned said sum. ( Tr. 52)
By the terms of the contract, therefore, the plaintiff
has :paid for 5 acres of the land, may enter onto said tract,
fully paid for and is entitled to receive clear title thereto.
POINT FIVE
The purchaser not required to file a claim against
estate of C. F. Player.
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The Sales Contract is entered into by and between
C. F. Player and Serena Player, his wife, as Sellers and
Heber W. Glenn as Buyer, and the said Serena Player who
is the defendant and respondent herein signed the said contract. (See Exhibit ( Tr. 45, 46)
The said defendant and respondent is therefore a primary party to the Sales Contract and there is no reason why a
claim should have been filed against the estate of her deceased husband, C. F. Player.
49 Am. Jur. Sec. 147. Specific Performance:
Specific performance of a contract may be decreed not
only between the parties, but between all those claiming under
them in privity of estate or representation or title.
Contracts for the conveyance of land are capable of
specific performance not only against the parties and their
voluntary grantees and vendees with notice, but as against
their heirs. devisees and widows.
Jennison vs. Leonard 21 Wall, 302,
Offutt vs. Offutt, 106 Md. 236, 67 A. 138
Middletown vs. Newport Hospital 16 RI 319, 15 A.
800

Robinson vs. McDonald 11 Tex, 385, 62 Am. Dec. 480.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated, the Decree of the District Court should be reversed and the appellant prevail.
Respectfully submitted,
Backman, Backman and Clark,
Attorneys for Appellant
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